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Abstract :  
The aim of the paper is to understand how one particular financial innovation, namely 
credit derivatives, has become a market and what kind of obstacles the promoters of the 
product have to face to achieve success. Following MacKenzie and Millo (2003) we focus on 
legitimacy issues taking into account  moral, political, cultural and social dimensions as well 
as the question of performativity of economic theory. More specifically, we propose to study 
the emergence and the development of the market for credit derivatives, such as has been seen 
in France since the end of 1997. This market presents two major characteristics, which make 
it different from the options market studied by Baker (1984) and by Mac Kenzie and Millo 
(2003). The market for credit derivatives is an over the counter market- a market of contracts 
exchanged between parties without the intermediary of a central authority in charge of 
organising the exchanges. In addition, this is a trans-national market, basically concerning 
large financial institutions and, in particular, investment banks throughout the world. How 
was this market born? How did it come about and how does it continue to function? What is 
the role played by the financial theory of risk in this process? Those are the questions we 
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The market as an object of study has been contested by sociologists against 
economists, for a certain number of years now. Since the work of Polanyi (1944) and 
Granovetter (1985) on economic sociology, members of the scientific community are 
beginning to see the need for enriching, or even going beyond functionalist explanations 
provided by economy if one wishes to understand the phenomena of the emergence, of the 
functioning and the conservation of markets for which perpetuity is rarely natural.  
These questions take on a particular meaning in the case of financial markets which, 
over the past few decades have acquired a central position in the financing of investments, of 
States, of pensions and in the management of the hazards which our Risk Society approaches 
very differently to previous societies (Knorr Cetina, 2004). As noted by Sassen (2004), the 
volume of financial assets since 1980 has grown three times faster than the combined GDP of 
the 23 country members of the OECD, and the volume of exchanges for stocks, bonds and 
currencies five times faster. This development is accompanied by the flourishing of many 
financial innovations which, following the introduction of options in 1973 on the Chicago 
market, are thriving on the refinement of financial technology. Financial Technology seems 
capable of producing complex instruments which, theoretically, can infinitely increase the 
number of classes of assets available to market investors 
Following on from the pioneering work of Baker (1984), MacKenzie and Millo (2003) 
try to understand how one particular financial innovation could become a market capable of 
surviving the different crises of legitimacy which, like any other innovation, it had to face. To 
this end, they focus on moral, political, cultural and social dimensions as well as on the 
question of performativity of economy, thereby mobilising the theoretical frameworks of 
Zelizer (1979), Fligstein (2001) and Callon (1998). This paper aims to contribute to this 
current trend of literature. More specifically, we propose to study the emergence and the 
development of the market for credit derivatives, such as has been seen in France since the 
end of 1997. This market presents two major characteristics, which make it different from the 
options market studied by Baker (1984) and by Mac Kenzie and Millo (2003). The market for 
credit derivatives is an over the counter market- a market of contracts exchanged between 
parties without the intermediary of a central authority in charge of organising the exchanges. 
In addition, this is a trans-national market, basically concerning large financial institutions 
and, in particular, investment banks throughout the world. How was this market born? How 
did it come about and how does it continue to function? What is the role played by the 
financial theory of risk in this process?  
The way in which financial innovations appear and become a success in an over the 
counter market immediately trans-national is in fact less documented and appears problematic 
from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. This paper, therefore, addresses the 
questions of collective action and the performativity of theories on this particular financial 
market.  We hold that the credit derivatives market presents strong specificities in comparison 
to other markets previously studied.  
 
The first part of the article develops the conceptual framework of the analysis using the main 
results obtained by the sociology of financial markets. . The second part presents the research 
method, based on a longitudinal qualitative study over the period 1996-2005, taken from 
interviews with the principal actors of the market and of an analysis of secondary data. The 
third part consists of a study of the emergence and the development of the market for credit 
derivatives, whilst the fourth and last part shows the results and the principal conclusions of 
the research.  
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1- Old Risk, New Market: The Enigma of the Development of a Trans-
national Over The Counter Market.  
 
The strongly sustained development of financial markets over the last decades poses the 
question of which factors underlie this evolution. Largely led along by the recurring 
apparition of financial innovations belonging, essentially, to the category of derivatives, the 
market growth is often seen as resulting from the apparition of new risks.. This idea proposed 
by Abolafia (1996), has often been used to explain, for example, the explosion of the market 
for interest rate derivatives during the 1980’s. It continues, in a remarkable way, to prevail 
over certain actors in the credit derivatives market, even though credit risk is historically at 
the heart of the banking business ever since this business has existed.   
But if credit risk is not a new risk, where did the radically new instruments used to 
manage it appear from in mid 1995? How did these innovations, originating from small teams 
of engineers employed by the large investment banks, succeed in establishing themselves into 
recognised financial products and to develop around themselves a veritable market of credit 
derivatives?   
 
1.1 The Emergence and the Development of Financial Markets 
 
MacKenzie and Millo (2003) are concerned with a related problematic concerning the 
market of options originating in 1973 in Chicago (Chicago Board Options Exchange, CBOE). 
They retrace the history of the first option markets in identifying the importance of 
ideological resistances and, in particular, the legal worries following the crash of 1929. They 
also highlight the technical barriers which had to be overcome concerning the calculation of 
option price. They insist on the notion of « performativity » of financial theory and on the 
decisive role of the valorisation of options formula suggested by Black and Scholes (1973) 
within the process of the construction of this market.  Their analysis therefore shows that 
Black and Scholes’ formula could only predict the price of options progressively, and 
especially from the moment where it had been used by financial market actors. It will become 
a common cognitive framework and will be incorporated, little by little, into the technical 
mechanisms. In addition, MacKenzie and Millo insist on the importance of the social network 
created by the product promoters (a very small number of individuals, motivated by a certain 
conception of the ‘common good” of the financial community). Without the network of 
interpersonal connections mobilized by some actors, the problems of collective action could 
not have been resolved and the American derivatives exchanges might have ceased to exist, at 
the moment of the serious financial crisis of 1987 in particular.  
 
However, the credit derivatives market presents important differences to that of 
options. It is based on a financial innovation which is not as clearly defined as that of options 
– a product which already existed in other forms and could be easily understood by investors.  
In any case, it straight away became an international market which was not the case when it 
was created for the options market in Chicago.  It is also an over-the counter- market which 
therefore does not make use of a central authority, and where buyers and sellers exchange 
contracts which are not – at least to begin with – strongly standardised. There is not, 
therefore, an immediate equivalent to the Chicago Board of Trade on this market, or to the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange as described by Mac Kenzie and Millo, and whose role was the 
development of the market which had become lifeless as a result of  tight regulation 
restrictions following the 1929 financial crisis (Mac Kenzie and Millo, 2003 : 113). It is also 
quite difficult in the credit derivatives market to identify individual creators of financial 
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quoted than those of individuals. Such a phenomenon is also described by Knorr Cetina 
(2004) who cast doubt on the idea that networks play the same structuring role on an over-the- 
counter market as they do on the market described by Mac Kenzie and Millo (2003). 
 
Finally, if the creation of the options market coincided with the publication of Black 
and Scholes’ (1973) evaluation model, there is no equivalent phenomenon for the credit 
derivative market.  No evaluation model is mentioned by market actors as being used by all 
with a plurality of models and even of approaches to valuation being highlighted as 
characteristic of this market.   
 
What then were the factors which permitted the development of the credit derivatives 
market? Whilst we are convinced that a study of the dynamic process by which the market 
was able to be created and to develop requires a specific analysis, we still propose to go from 
an invariant in the literature and to explore the question from the angle of legitimisation as 
highlighted by Zelizer (1979). 
 
1.2 The Process of Legitimisation   
 
V.Zelizer (1979) had the seminal idea that, in order to exist, a financial product may need to 
overcome very strong moral and cultural resistance. The history of life insurance in the US 
underlines the deep-seated cultural resistance to which this innovation was confronted. The 
diffusion of American Life Insurance was more than a matter of economics or sophisticated 
actuarial variables. The business challenged deeply-institutionalized values relating to death 
and also defied a set of cultural and religious beliefs and ideas on risk and gambling, i.e. a 
powerful normative pattern. Changing attitudes towards risk-taking and gambling had a major 
impact on the legitimisation of life insurance, and thus on the development of the market. A 
more or less comparable phenomenon was described by Mac Kenzie and Millo who showed 
the discredit which still existed on the futures market in the US at the end of the 1960’s – a 
discredit which went back to the financial disaster of 1929. The market promoters succeeded 
in legitimizing the options market and getting round this discredit - particularly by 
distinguishing futures from options and by mobilising all the «  rationalist  » resources 
provided by financial theory in order to price the options  
Abolafia (1996) looked at older markets and demonstrated the importance of specific 
organisational measures to meet potential legitimacy crises on an already developed financial 
market. Thus, he observed a phenomenon which also characterises the credit derivatives 
market. In fact, a tension exists which is inscribed in the heart of the activity itself that large 
investment banks conduct on financial markets. The attraction of potential profits to be 
obtained on these markets in fact leads banks to organise the profession of traders in a non- 
hierarchical manner, permitting the traders to act as individual entrepreneurs, remunerated 
according to their results by bonuses which can be extremely large. Meanwhile, the danger 
exists that the risk taken by the traders – or their opportunist behaviour – can lead to a 
catastrophe threatening the existence of the employing financial institution – and beyond, the 
very existence of the market. The stakes here become particularly crucial when investment 
banking clients are perceived as being vulnerable and when the security of their interests leads 
the regulator to intervene.  When this happens, the public begins to question the legitimacy of 
the financial activities on the market. This mechanism links-up with the auto-destruct 
mechanism as theorised by Polyani (1944). It explains the phenomenon observed in practice 
by which massive financial market crises are often followed by a period of re-regulation. But 
if the tension described here exists on the credit derivatives market as on other financial 
markets, the way to a solution, as described by Abolafia (1996) is more problematic in the Huault-Rainelli, Egos 2006, Bergen, Sub-theme 01, SWG: Comparative Study of Economic 
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case under consideration. Historically, the way to deal with this problem has in fact consisted 
of confiding the promotion, the organisation, the protection and the legitimisation of the 
market to Stock Market agencie. In other words, to entrust them with all that was perceived 
by the all the actors to be of common interest to all: the organisation of exchanges, the 
production of innovations susceptible to maintain the interest of investors in the market and 
the conservation of autonomy when confronted by the potential reinforcement of regulations. 
The absence of market structure in the case of over-the-counter markets – of which that of 
credit derivatives is an example - therefore poses the question of knowing how this common 
interest (the existence of the market and the conservation of its legitimacy in times of crisis) is 
taken into hand by the actors.   
 
Abolafia’s results therefore lead us into wondering about the specificity of the market 
under consideration. If we admit with  Knorr Cetina (2004) the extreme disembeddedness of 
the international over-the-counter markets which function, according to her, as communities 
separate from the local context, the way in which problems of legitimacy are resolved at the 
moment they are created as well as during the course of their development, poses questions.  
As notes Sassen (2005), these markets cannot totally withdraw themselves from the context in 
which they appeared. They need mechanisms of guarantee for the contracts exchanged and 
diverse protection in order to function. This requires a certain type of de-regulation in relation 
to the existing regulatory framework which obliges promoters to contact the regulators. In any 
case, they themselves produce new standards which become integrated into national public 
policies. Sassen (2004) poses a question on the real power which the markets wield over 
national governments, on the way in which this power alters democratic functioning and, in 
particular, the responsibility which governments have vis-à-vis the electors.  
 
In other words, if we accept what  Zelizer (1979) and Mac Kenzie and Millo (2003) 
say about the moral and cultural problematic of acceptance of a new financial product, of 
Abolafia the inherited idea of Polanyi that the crises of legitimacy are inherent in the 
development of financial markets and of Sassen the questioning on the relationship between 
the desire for regulation and the pressure on national regulation exercised by these  global 
markets, we are  led to pose the following questions: How can we explain the emergence of a 
market of credit derivatives, an over-the-counter market which is immediately trans-national? 
Through what market mechanisms has this market overcome the questions of legitimacy 
posed by its creation? How has the innovation which makes up the credit derivatives 
succeeded in imposing itself at a national level, and in what relationship with normalisation 
and regulation?  
 
1.3 The Role Played by Risk Financial Theory as a “Calculative Device” 
 
We already know that it is difficult to identify a network of individuals, whose role is 
to promote the market and that the absence of a centralised market organising exchanges 
renders the process even more vague than in cases described in literature. Re-examining the 
enigma  which first motivated the writing of this paper – can prove to be fruitful. The 
apparition of credit derivatives is often presented by market actors as corresponding to the 
emergence of a new risk – a weak argument when one considers that credit risk management 
has been at the heart of banking management ever since banks were created. Without 
commenting on the possibility that this risk has increased in recent years nor on the conditions 
which might have been renewed for the banking system worldwide
1, it is interesting to note 
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that representatives of investment banks – who are also promoters of this product - resort to a  
very precise cognitive framework to support the market. This framework places the 
management of risk at the heart of the functioning of financial markets. Modern financial 
theory, coming as it does, from the work of Markowitz and Sharpe, in fact considers financial 
markets as risk markets; more than financial assets, investors exchange risk against financial 
returns – the ideal situation being where each type of risk is the object of a financial market 
i.e.: with sufficient liquidity for the price to be reliably observable at any given moment.   
The multiplication of classes of assets, i.e.: types of risks dealt with by the market are 
advantageous for investors as it allows them to diversify their portfolio in an efficient way, 
according to Markowitz’s theory. The management of risk by the market is also advantageous 
to the financial system as a whole as it allows the optimal allocation between buyers and 
vendors of risk. This theoretical framework which mixes results from mathematical micro 
economy and financial theory is clearly much more than a specific mathematical model. It 
provides the common referential of bearers of financial innovations, who are basically 
engineers working in the large trading rooms of the main investment banks. This is how they 
see the financial innovations they put forward, financial theory according them a sort of 
register of “calculative devices” which they then need to teach to the potential actors of a 
market which does not yet exist. This role, played by what we will call the financial theory of 
risk management is closely linked to the framework proposed by Callon and Muniesa (2005). 
These authors show that a market develops when calculative agencies are capable of imposing 
their calculative device on other market actors. In favouring a very concrete approach of 
financial markets this interpretive framework provides a definition of the notion of calculating 
which makes visible the elements and the mechanisms which allow the market to behave as a 
collective system of calculation; this process permits their development and their 
legitimization.  
This framework of analysis seems well adapted to the empirical studying of the emergence of 
an over-the-counter financial market for several reasons: First of all, in situations which can 
often be ambiguous, as is the case for an over-the counter market - which concerns agents 
with contradictory conceptions and interests, where a profound incertitude on the 
characteristics of products reigns - the question of collective systems allowing actors to reach 
a compromise becomes crucial. Furthermore, this framework permits one to place the accent 
on quantitative or qualitative arrangements - for instance normalisation and regulation – 
which render calculation possible. Finally, this approach allows us to underline the diversity 
of different possible forms of market organisation considered as measures to calculate the 
value of assets. As Callon and Muniesa (2005) point out, because they are obsessed by the 
determination of prices, by the configuration of calculative agencies and by the organisation 
of their encounter, financial markets are  good candidates for a study of how economic 
calculations and the different modalities of their combinations manifest themselves.  
 
With this perspective in view, one can ask how certain calculative agencies – in particular 
banks – manage to impose their calculative device on other credit derivatives market actors, 
in other words what strategies they employ to put into place the definition of a credit 
derivative and to make it evolve towards their intended goal. One can also pose questions on 
the technical mechanisms constructed and implemented by the actors in order to contain 
and/or limit market “excesses” (Callon, 1998) and on the manner in which banks manage to 
produce new cognitive frameworks (Callon, 1998, Ferraro et al., 2005) ; In particular in 
situations where new activities have to be financially evaluated (Beunza and Garud, 2004; 
Gond, 2006). 
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We show in this paper how the development of the market results from an effort of the agents, 
first, to remove the uncertainties related to the creation and the use of a new product in 






This article is based on a longitudinal qualitative study of the emerging activity of credit 
derivatives in France, from the mid-1990’s to 2004. Our aim is to contribute to the 
understanding of the development of an over-the-counter financial market by providing an 
integrated view of this process.  While the market is trans-national, the resources necessary to 
study its worldwide development globally are far beyond the scope of this paper. Our 
approach will thus be intentionally focused on how French banks take part in the process. We 
hope in this way to obtain a precise insight into the legitimization process at stake in this 
market. 
Qualitative research is well suited when "(a) contextualization, (b) vivid description, (c) 
dynamic (and possible causal) structuring of the organizational members’ socially constructed 
world, and (d) the worldviews of the people under study" (Lee, 1999: 43) are important.  
Those points are central when investigating the emergence and development of a world-wide 
financial market. 
 
2.1 Data Collection 
 
We develop an analysis of the processes of definition, creation and promotion of the market 
for credit derivatives. The central activity for data collection was an individual interview with 
each of the targeted informants. As in McKenzie and Millo’s study (2003) and McKenzie 
(1990), interviewing was necessary because neither financial/trade press sources nor archival 
sources were sufficient to be able to address our research questions. A total of 35 semi-
structured interviews  were conducted, taped and transcribed from 2003 to 2005. We 
conducted semi-structured interviews with market-practitioners, regulators and experts
2 in 
Paris and in London, in order to obtain the most complete view of the emergence of this 
market from a nationally focused point of view. The analysis of the market was carried out 
principally from the point of view of French banks and of their employees based in London.  
As we shall see, these banks constitute important actors in the credit derivatives market in the 
world.   
Our main questions consisted of identifying the most important actors in the market, to 
analyse their activities and their relationship with regulatory and normalisation institutions.   
This allowed us to gain an in-depth knowledge of this field and to compare and contrast the 
different positions of different actors in order to obtain a triangulated cross-section, thereby 
providing a certain degree of control over results through widening the range of data sources.  
Interviews lasted between 2 hours and 3 hours. Analysis of several secondary sources 
comprising a series of internal archives, press articles and books was also undertaken
3.  
                                                 
2 The actors interviewed were members of the Commission Bancaire (the Banking Commission), la Commission de 
Contrôle des Assurances (the Insurance Control Commission), l’Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Financiers (the 
Financial Market Regulating Authority), the ISDA, and different banks (Société Générale, BNP Paribas, Exane Asset 
Management, Fortis Banque). Financial Market Experts, Legal Experts and Economists were also interviewed.  
3 The authors would like to thank Esthelle Touré for the research and analysis of the contents of secondary data 
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Several sources of publication were chosen. The criteria of specialization of the journals in 
the domain of financial information were selected.  Three French sources were chosen:   La 
Tribune, l’Agefi  and the journal Banque (Banque Magazine, Banque et Droit, Banque et 
Marché). The articles were chosen from the study period 1996-2004. 1996 was in fact the 
date from which French media started to publish articles on credit derivatives. In total 262 
articles made up our data base, starting from research on the term “credit derivative”.  
Through these documents, we were able to reconstitute events, within the context of a 
procedural analysis.  
 
2.2 Data Analysis 
Data analysis was conducted mobilizing various strategies to make sense of these 
processes data, such as the narrative strategy and/or grounded theory strategy (Langley, 
1999).  The whole pattern of the development of the market emerged from a progressive 
interpretation of the data. 
First, we organized the material (interviews and secondary data) in order to produce a 
"facts database" for the creation of the market (Yin, 1989).  That database chronicles the key 
facts related to the emergence and the institutionalization of the market and is based on 
verbatim and/or secondary data collected through various sources (press articles, internet 
presentation, books on credit derivatives…). Each article belonging to our data base was thus 
coded by specifying the actors and their actions.  
Secondly, by using these raw data, we were able to construct a narrative of the 
emergence of the market, and to analyze the work of promotion realized by actors. Thirdly, 
the interpreted data was re-organized in order to facilitate the analysis of the definition of 





3- Case Analysis 
 
The process of development of the credit derivatives market is first of all presented. Then we 
analyse the means employed by the actors to legitimize the market and also the different 
obstacles they had to face.   
 
3.1  The Credit Derivatives Market: History and Development.  
 
The first credit derivatives appeared in the 1990’s in the US. The proposition of the 
Creditmetrics model by JP Morgan and the acknowledgement of the product as a financial 
instrument obtained in England by the ISDA, the Association whose members are the 
principal financial institutions promoting derivative products, means that 1997 was the year of 
true recognition for this financial innovation. Therefore, we choose – somewhat arbitrarily – 
this year as the year of start of the credit derivatives market. Its ensuing growth was extremely 
rapid.  From loans outstanding of 180 billion dollars in 1997, the notional amounts
4 in 2004 
reached a record volume of 5000 billion dollars, according to BBA (British Bankers 
Association) statistics.  Estimates for the coming years suggest sustained growth.  (See Graph 
1). 
                                                 
4 The notional amount represents the amount subjacent to the contract on which the derivative products are 
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GRAPH 1- Global evolution of credit derivatives market  
GLOBAL CREDIT DERIVATIVES MARKET 











1997/1998 SURVEY 180 350 740
1999/2000 SURVEY 586 893 1581
2001/2002 SURVEY 1189 1952 4799
2003/2004 SURVEY 3548 5021 8206
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006
 
        British Bankers' Association Credit Derivatives Report 2003/2004
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The financial innovation which makes up credit derivatives, resides in the fact of isolating the 
credit risk in order to exchange it on the market. The creditor (purchaser of the protection) 
can, in this way, transfer the associated credit risk to another party (the vendor of the 
protection) whilst still retaining the debt in his/her balance sheet. In reality, this principle is 
applied according to two quite distinct modalities. A first type of product of which the main 
representative is the CDS (Credit Default Swap) is made up of relatively simple, standard 
contracts, whereas a second family of so-called structured products is made up of very 
specific, tailor-made contracts which are often complex. A description of the principal 
financial mechanisms operating in these different contracts can be found in the appendix 1. 
The principal actors in this market are the large investment banks, insurance companies and 
mutual fund companies. One should add the regulators which can be organised as unique 
authorities for all the financial services as in England (Financial Service Authority) or distinct 
for insurance companies (Commission de Contrôle des Assurances (CCA), for banks 
(Commission Bancaire) and for management companies (AMF) as in France. The national 
regulators are also organised into international authorities, as part of the Joint Forum created 
in 1999. Finally, the particular role played by the ISDA
6 in the promotion and the 
development of the market should be noted.  Apart from its interactions with the regulator, the 
ISDA’s action principally lies in a very important effort of normalisation, of production of 
documentation thereby permitting the lifting of legal risks concerning instruments which, 
before all, remain mutual agreement contracts. The precise definition of a default event would 
lead the ISDA, following on from litigation, to re-examine its documentation several times. 
According to the terminology employed by Callon and Muniesa (2005), we can consider these 
different actors as calculative agencies with heterogeneous cultural and technical equipment 
which, when it comes to dealing credit derivatives – ie: the creation of a veritable market for 
this innovation – supposes the adopting of a common calculative device.  
 
                                                 
5 For 2006, an estimate only.   
6 International Swaps and Derivatives Associations: the ISDA is a global trade association representing leading 
participants in the privately negotiated derivatives industry, a business which includes interest rates, currency, 
commodity, credit and equity swaps, as well as related products such as caps, collars, floors and swaptions. ISDA was 
chartered in 1985 and numbers over 650 member institutions from 44 countries on six continents. Its board is primarily 
composed of banks. Huault-Rainelli, Egos 2006, Bergen, Sub-theme 01, SWG: Comparative Study of Economic 
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Concerning market structuration, it is quite difficult to obtain recent statistics; as the market is 
an over-the-counter market, data is missing and the coherence of sources remains 
problematic. Figures for 2003, collected in particular by the Bank for International 
Settlements, give some indicators on the international evolution of the credit derivatives 
market. At the end of 2003, these represented a little under 2% of the total market for over-
the-counter derivative products traded in the world. Its evolution, slow to begin with, then 
more rapid  demonstrated  good resistance to the Asiatic crisis of 1998 and also when faced 
with the wave of  defaults during 2001-2003, as well as the major bankruptcies of that time  
(Parmalat, Enron, Worldcom). London is the financial leader for this market, alone realising 
more than 50% of transactions.   
A summary of the distribution of principal actors can be found in the appendix 2.  
 It must also be noted that despite the great number of potential actors, the market remains 
extremely concentrated with, according to ISDA, 50% of transactions realised by six principal 
actors which are JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, Merryl Linch, UBS, City Bank and Morgan 
Stanley. 
In any case, this concentration is to be found on the French market if one is to believe the 
results of a survey
7 carried out in 2004 by the commission bancaire (CB) (the Banking 
Commission), la commission de contrôle des assurances (CCA) (the Insurance Controlling 
Commission) and the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) (the Financial Market 
Authority) which reveals the structure of a market.  
 
GRAPH 2 - Notional outstanding loans of credit derivatives concluded by French banks (in 














Source Banque de France RSF • Les dérivés de crédit, new source of financial  instability ? • 
Novembre 2002 
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  Source: Banque de France • RSF • Results of a French survey on instruments of 
transfer of credit risk . June 2004 
Three French banks have developed a veritable operation around credit derivatives: - in rank 
order,  Société Générale, BNP Paribas and CAlyon. In the continuation of our paper we study 
the way in which French banks have participated in the process of legitimization of credit 





3.2 Give Birth to and Perpetuate the Market.   
 
In their efforts to develop and legitimize the credit derivatives market, banks used different 
means of action such as justification, lobbying and technical and institutional mechanisms. 
However, the process came against obstacles notably linked to cultural differences and 
political conflicts between the actors.  
 
3.2.1 The Means of Legitimization.  
 
-  Promoting the calculative device: an economic and functionalist 
justification   
 
Conceived by engineers from large business banks, credit derivatives are seen by their 
designers as the product of the extension of the financial theory of risk to a risk that until now 
was largely dealt with outside of the market.  To make the credit derivatives market emerge is 
therefore a question of succeeding in the marketisation of credit risk which, over and above 
the small group of its designers, is far from easy to achieve. This is why banks devote a good 
deal of effort in promoting their doctrine. It is a question of showing that credit derivatives are 
an instrument of risk management in the financial sense of the term – in other words, a 
derivative like any other. Two important points are put forward: The first is the interest which 
exists for different actors in exchanging risks on a transparent market which allows a better 
risk allocation. The second is the efficiency of the product as a hedging instrument for 
banking risk and the contribution of this innovation in improving the global financial system.  
 
What is of prime interest for investment banks as the main promoters of the market, is to rally 
the other potential actors round to the idea that credit derivatives is a financial instrument like 
another and renders possible, for the greater benefit of all, the management of credit risk  as a 
financial risk. They also devote a lot of their efforts into demonstrating the qualities of the 
new instrument in the terms of the financial theory of risk.  
When one of his colleagues has just stated that the market starting point depends on the desire 
of large investment banks to respond to the hardening of international banking regulations in 
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“ I am not sure that this was the starting point. It’s true that it was up to banks to do away with a part of 
the regulatory capital, which they saw to be excessive (….) But the market existed before (….) Another 
reason for the birth of the market was the relative blockage of the inter-banking market. Banks played 
on a market of concentrated swaps and the counterparty risks were great. Credit derivatives appeared as 
an instrument of risk diversification (….) It was also one way of offering  certain clients higher returns 
by proposing tailor-made products.” (An ISDA representative)  
 
Other affirmative voices support the same view:  
 “What is important is to create new products for investors. We are always looking for new kinds of 
assets. All this is a question of diversification”. (A banker) 
 
“ To begin with, it was a question of hedging. Then followed acceleration in the market which came 
from the question of investments”. (A banker)  
 
The necessity to introduce financial innovation into the classical framework of financial 
instruments supposes first of all choosing the relevant analogy which will help to « sell the 
product », an analogy which will be obvious to some and less so to others:  
 
 “Credit Default Swaps were especially created to manage the risk as represented by important clients 
such as Renault and their credit lines. The technology was well known: it was that of the swap” (A 
banker)  
 “ To begin with, the product had nothing to do with derivatives; they had nothing to do with existing 
technology. In any case, we hesitated about what to call them. The CDS’s could just as easily have been 
called CD Puts (…).” (another banker). 
 
With this problem resolved, those promoting the innovation committed themselves into what 
they called « pedagogic » actions: 
 “ It was primarily a question of discussing with clients, of education, of de-mystifying or popularising 
complicated documentation”. (A banker)  
  
 “Very few people really understand what credit derivatives really are. (….) To establish a legitimacy of 
the market, we lobbied, did demonstrations to explain how it worked to clients, we organised 
conferences within the AGEFI framework – a formidable lobbying mechanism. We also published 
articles in the AGEFI and in Banque et Droit. We experienced all, in terms of clients – especially 
mutual fund companies”. (A banker) 
 
An analysis of the specialized press permits a quantitative evaluation of the effort which 
banks make to convince potential clients. Between 1996 and 2000, 77% of the articles written 
by professional financiers, publishing as experts in the specialized press are devoted to the 
presentation of credit derivatives as instruments of great performance of risk management 
with 50 % of the articles coming explicitly from banks dealing with the same topics.  
If acquirers and potential vendors of protection are informed of the advantages of the products 
in terms of the management of financial risks, banks in parallel seek to make the idea 
accepted that the creation of a credit derivatives market contributes to a better global 
allocation of the risks and to a reinforcement of international market stability. The way in 
which the international financial system has resisted against the large bankruptcies of Enron 
and Parmalat is often held up as implicit proof that credit derivatives contribute to greater 
stability.   
 
“ In any case, the large defaulters (Enron, Worldcom) have not engendered major problems” (a banker)  
“ Anyway, after what has happened, we cannot see what could be worse than, Enron or Parmalat. The 
DC’s contributed much in halting the systematic risk: proved soundness, good functioning beyond all 
hope”. (A legal expert).   
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This said the question of the contribution of credit derivatives, to the diminution or on the 
contrary to the augmentation of systematic risk is not considered as having been settled:  
 
“Do the DC’s augment or diminish systematic risk? This is talked about amongst ourselves or with 
others in the bank – those who are in charge of regulations or high-up managers. (….) As for myself, I 
do not have much of an opinion on the question. Positively speaking, there is diffusion of credit risk. 
Negatively speaking, the concentration between so few actors or on certain sectors of the market can be 
a problem.” (A banker).   
 
This uncertainty, of course, is felt by the regulators who also have reservations; hence the 
importance of the actions of promoters towards regulators in the process of legitimization of 
the product.  
 
 
-  Attempting to impose the calculative device : the lobbying process   
Credit risk is a very particular risk triggered by specific events (a default by a debtor, for 
example). It is therefore not a risk of variation in price of the underlying asset as would be the 
case for a traditional derivative product (interest rate derivative or exchange).   To make 
regulators admit the fairness of the acceptation according to which credit risk can be treated 
as a classic financial risk therefore represents a major challenge. The possibility of using the 
product as a tool for hedging risks and of exchanging this product on a market depends on the 
position adopted by regulators on this point. More specifically, the debate with the regulator 
turns around two principal points. The first concerns the legal qualification of the product; the 
second the degree of risk actually represented by the credit derivatives.  
The specificity of the credit risk – a risk materialised by the arrival of a specific event could 
lead one to consider credit derivatives as a kind of insurance contract. It is incumbent on 
banks to combat this vision for two reasons. Insurance contracts fall under the insurance 
monopoly and cannot be treated by banking actors. Apart from this, the qualification of credit 
derivatives in financial products would allow mutual funds and especially hedge funds to 
access these products – this being seen as necessary for the development of a market which, 
in order to exist, needs sellers of protection as well as buyers.     
 
Banks which are active in capital markets have gathered within ISDA and try to work on the 
regulator. The fact that ISDA in June 1997 succeeded in obtaining the legal decision they 
wanted from Robin Potts QC that  credit default swaps were not insurance contracts, but 
financial products is unanimously acknowledged as one of the great successes of the 
organisation ; what was at stake was of primordial importance  
“ This point is essential as a bank cannot sell insurance. Without this « Potts’ opinion », there would 
have been no market at all. This clarification was essential. The question of the qualification of the 
product had quickly been posed by the Financial Law Panel of the Bank of England (the regulator at 
that time)” (a representative of the IDSA).  
 
The intensity of the debate around the legal qualification of credit derivatives was also 
illustrated in France by the fact that a law thesis was devoted to the question in 1999
8. The 
author, A. Gauvin (2003) maintained in later research  that credit derivatives (and, as it 
happens, the whole of derivative products) could come under the gaming and gambling laws – 
a problem which was also mentioned at the moment the options market was opened in 
Chicago, as underline Mac Kenzie and Millo (2003). A Gauvin notes the closeness of the way 
both French and British legal systems rejected this legal qualification and attributes the result 
to the victory of economic matters over purely legal thinking.  
                                                 
8 A. Gauvin, Nature et régime juridique des dérivés de crédit, PhD Thesis Sorbonne Paris 1, 8 September 1999. Huault-Rainelli, Egos 2006, Bergen, Sub-theme 01, SWG: Comparative Study of Economic 
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“The strength of financial stakes which (derivative products) represent is such that their being put into 
question in a given financial place or a particular country could have harmful consequences for the 
banking industry and local finance”.  
 
The other possibilities of legal qualification studied by the author are those relative to banking 
operations (credit operations) and insurance operations, the aim of his work being to show 
that the legal regime which finally prevailed over credit derivatives, ie: the regime applicable 
to financial instruments in accordance with the law n°96-597 de Modernisation des Activités 
Financières of 2 July 1996, is, on a legal argumentative basis, extremely debateable.   
 
In France, the debate on the legal qualification of credit derivatives has come down around 
the possibility given to the OPCVM (Mutual fund companies) to use credit derivatives or not. 
This access of OPCVM’s – something of great importance to promoters of the product - was 
validated by decree on 10 December 2002 after four years of discussions and consultations. It 
expressively authorises the OPCVM’s to sign credit derivatives over the counter contracts. 
Welcomed by promoters of the product, this decree was not unanimously welcomed by 
others:  
“Our lobbying achieved its target: credit derivatives are no longer qualified as credit operations and no 
longer come under the banking monopoly. The legal qualification debate has been resolved”. (a banker)  
 “The decree casts aside the legal qualification of credit derivatives” (A. Gauvin, Interview at the 
AGEFI 5 December 2002) 
 
The text also highlights the embarrassing situation the legislator finds himself in when he 
imposes on the OPCVM not to subscribe to credit derivatives in order to sell protection but 
with the aim of managing the savings which are entrusted to him. Meanwhile, the co-
contracting bank will sign the contract not to offer the OPCVM to subscribe to an investment 
product, but to buy him protection (A Gauvin (2003). 
 
However, lobbying of regulators by investment banks does not only concern the qualification 
of credit derivatives – as we have just seen – but also the degree of risk which these products 
create for the different market actors.  
 
To make credit derivatives acknowledged as risk hedging instruments represents stakes with 
great immediacy for banks. International regulations in fact oblige them to cover the risk of 
their assets by sufficient capital which in stricto sensu lessens the profitability for their 
shareholders. The management of risks has therefore become a strategic activity for them. 
The extension of this risk management, to risks that were not until now considered as 
financial risks, highlights an extremely original phenomenon. Contrary to the traditional 
vision by which the regulation constrains and sometimes, as in the case described by 
MacKenzie and Millo, close the market down, we observe on the credit derivatives market an 
hitherto unseen role played by the prudential regulation issued mainly by the Basel 
Committee. The regulation is indeed at the source of a new financial market.   
 
To get credit derivatives accepted as instruments of risk diminution, banks naturally 
turn towards their national regulator, which in France is the Commission bancaire.  
  
“To begin with, it was a question of credit establishments wanting credit derivatives market instruments 
legally recognised.   Banks laid siege on supervisors to obtain a reduction in capital charges off their 
balance sheet.  . (…) To begin with, the approach was not coordinated internationally. There were 
informal discussions but each country chose its own way of dealing”. (A representative of the 
Commission Bancaire)”. 
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At the international level banks chose to pit their weight against the regulators within 
the ISDA, in order to reduce the regulatory capital charge levied on them.  The IDSA has very 
significant means at its disposition:  
“At a global level the ISDA has colossal clout, they pay lawyers worldwide, all the profession joins, and 
they lobby the regulators”. (A banker) 
 
Directly making propositions to the Basel Committee and the national regulators, the ISDA 
fought particularly to obtain recognition of internal evaluation models
9 by the regulators of 
the Basel 2 framework. The combat ended in a defeat but has today led to renewing efforts to 
obtain satisfaction in Basel 3.   
 
“Within the framework of a working group preparing Basel 3, the ISDA will produce a study showing 
the growing convergence of models, which increasingly achieve the same results. Concerning Basel 2, 
the ISDA is not in a position to react on the chosen model”. (A representative of the ISDA) 
  
 
-  Raising the credibility of the calculative device and making the theory 
perform. 
 
In addition, in parallel to lobbying and in order to push the market forward, it was necessary 
to give credit derivatives a recognisable framework and banks turned, quite naturally, to the 
documentation produced since 1986 by the ISDA, for derivate products. The ISDA, whose 
role is to define standardized contracts for over-the-counter derivatives commenced the 
important task of documentation standardisation for these products in the early eighties and 
published in 1986 a code of definitions followed by a standard form agreement in 1987. A 
standard agreement was formalised in 1992, then in 2002: the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, 
the objective of which being to make up a standard form governing future transactions. On the 
10 February 2003, the ISDA renewed its documentation relating to credit derivatives by 
publishing new definitions - the 2003 ISDA Credit Definitions – designed to facilitate 
exchanges, reinforce transactions, helping market growth and increasing market liquidity. 
This is how the market became progressively stabilised as the normalisation permitted to 
correct legal inadequacies. Highly situated legal experts of the ISDA very concerned by 
banking daily practice elaborated norms pragmatically, and carefully analysed the contracts 
and their different clauses.  
“The first market problem was the absence of formalisation of frameworks and definitions. It was 
therefore urgent to put ISDA documentation in place. ISDA norms represent a common language”. (A 
banker).  
“We carry out actions concerning actions of normalisation, of documentation and respond to Joint 
Forum and FSA reports. The ISDA is also very active, working alongside the   Commission Bancaire in 
France and has assisted national and international regulators. But the role of normalisation in order to 
render the market more liquid is by far greater than that of influence on the regulations.” (A 
representative from the ISDA) 
 
During the development of the market, the specificity of the product obliged the ISDA, 
several times, to change its product definitions – generally as a result of legal disagreements - 
as the precise definition of a product is a necessary condition of the existence of a market and 
of its continuity.   
                                                 
9 In other terms, the doctrine of the ISDA is that it should be the banks themselves who define the method of 
calculating the risk represented by their activities in derivative products.  The regulator remains reticent when faced 
with the use of internal models – different from one bank to another, and on the definition over which he/she had no 
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“The pragmatic approach of the ISDA must be praised: every crisis, incident or dispute is an 
opportunity to re-consider and to improve the documentation. The ISDA has demonstrated its great 
flexibility and its ability to adapt to events. The construction and use of framework-conventions permit 
a harmonisation of operations and thereby ensure they are more secure and more fluid” (A legal expert).  
“ Certain crises and disputes such as the Conseco, RealTrack, Parmalat, and LTCM affairs and the crisis 
in Argentina meant we had to re-examine the documentation. The ISDA has worked very hard to clarify 
things – in particular those which concern the credit event that trigger the credit derivative payments, as 
we have examples of cases in the US where credit derivatives payments were unduly asked  – without 
the default being acknowledged by the two parties” (An ISDA representative).  
 
In parallel to  normalisation actions, it was also necessary to give credit to credit derivatives 
as risk management tools and to show that they were capable of becoming an asset exchanged 
on a market – in the classic financial market sense, characterised by  transparency and 
widespread diffusion of risk prices.  Questions of valorisation on the market then become 
central.   
 
To this end, from 2002, banks joined together in order to produce standard product indices.  
What one observes here is   performation of theory, to the extent that the construction of these 
indices permits the validation of the idea that credit risk is indeed a market risk. As soon as 
the prices can be observed, credit derivatives can be registered as financial products – in an 
accounting way – eligible to accounting norm IAS 39, which reinforce banking doctrine.  
 
The construction of indices is very common in financial markets; Stock Market indices are a 
well-known example. In trying to demonstrate that credit risk can be considered as a 
traditional financial risk, investment banks have for a long time attempted to introduce indices 
which would give clear signals to the market on the credit risk market price. Indices that were 
written on bonds have first been used, but they never reached liquidity or the necessary 
representativity for their credibility (Bruyère, 2004)). The development of credit derivatives 
re-launched the need for indexing at the same time as giving the opportunity of creating new 
indices.  The idea was to use the relative standardisation of the leading product - the CDS - in 
order to create a basket of CDS’s dealt in the world and to furnish an average price of the 
operation which could be referred to at any moment. JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley were the 
first to launch, separately, two indices constructed from the CDS market in 2002. In 2003, 
these two indices joined together (the new index thus created being called  TRAC-X), 
whereas another group of actors (which included  Deutsche Bank, ABN Amro, then 
Citygroup and Société Générale) launched, in competition, an index called  i BOXX.  In April 
2004, the necessity to furnish an index of reference presenting the best liquidity possible led 
the two competing indices to join up together again. The aim of this alliance was to ensure a 
sufficient quantity of exchanges to guarantee the liquidity of the index – which participates in 
the structuring of the market. Additionally, this facilitates credit derivatives to be seen as 
financial instruments, in accounting terms, as the requirement for being accounted for under 
IAS 39 is the possibility of registering profits on the basis of observable data.   
Credit derivations are also given credit through the coexistence of two distinct market 
segments with the first participating in the legitimizing of the second. For the first segment, 
which in reality represents the majority of transactions, relatively standardised contracts – for 
the most part, CDS’s - are exchanged and there is an attempt to develop the liquidity and the 
transparency of the market.  This segment becomes naturally included with what investment 
banks call flow markets. 
“ Market techniques have been standardised, the ISDA has declared what options are possible. We 
chose termly dates in order to have more liquidity” (a banker).  
“ In 2003, CDS trading joined together with Bond trading: ie flow credit. (…) a CDS trader can come 
from the rate or the exchange”. (a banker)  
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But the development of this standardized segment (it should be noted that indices are 
constructed on this segment), if it contributes to the legitimization of the marketization of 
credit risk, is not without drawbacks for investment banks: 
“ It all amounts to the cycle of, innovation. To begin with, we want a margin, we want to be the first, then 
we want to create volume, the margins narrow, the system must be improved, for example by providing 
the possibility of doing on line trading”. (A Banker) 
 
Investment banks also continue to develop a second market segment– of structured products, 
otherwise known as tailor-made – where the problematic of volume does not exist and, 
finally, which has little resemblance to the classical financial market. The retaining of large 
margins impedes transparency, tensions with the regulator remain vivid, client relationships 
are more complex and there is no reference price.    
 
The flow segment therefore appears less profitable but necessary to the segment of structured 
products to furnish the necessary liquidity for the product to gain credibility and for the idea 
of a risk market to gain ground. 
 
As soon as credit derivatives are presented as classic derivative products, quite naturally, the 
question of their valorisation is posed.  
The absence of consensus on this question is a problem for banks in permitting regulators to 
impose their own modalities of evaluation. In addition, it contributes to the absence of 
transparency and is contrary to the creation of confidence in the market.  
This question is resolved quite differently according to the two segment of the credit 
derivatives market.  On the flow market, the idea is to standardise products as much as 
possible in such a way that the competition being exercised without mercy and quite openly, 
the market prices applied (and transmitted to all the banks through means fine-tuned by 
Lombard, BNP –in the form of a Reuters page -, or by JP Morgan –in the form of a 
Bloomberg function) are assimilated into a quote. It is not then necessary to value the product 
using a theoretical model as the market « gives » its price at any given moment.  This method, 
called mark to market obviously supposes a large number of exchanges, ie: large liquidity 
which continues to remain a problem on the credit derivative market:  
 
“It’s an over the counter market, more or less liquid. The sales argument here is one of liquidity but it’s 
wishful thinking.” (A Regulator) 
 
“Each bank to its method:  mark-to market prices remain somewhat divergent” (A banker) 
 
As regards the structured product segment, which by definition remains hardly liquid and 
hardly transparent, the question of valorisation remains largely problematic. The problem of 
setting a tariff on a risk which is by definition discontinued and difficult to evaluate is an 
obstacle to the direct importing of methods coming from the theory of financial risk. Faced 
with this difficulty, JP Morgan, revealed, on the 2 April 1997, CreditMetrics, “ first portfolio 
model destined for the management of credit risk” (Bruyère (2004)) who followed on the 
RiskMetrics model, which it had tried to impose for the management of market risks. The 
aim, according to JP Morgan was to make available a tool which would facilitate the 
understanding and use of new credit risk management instruments, which « until then, had 
been little known and poorly mastered when compared to other market risks  “. For this 
operation JP Morgan was in association with the main investment banks and hoped to 
«  promote transparency on the different credit risk markets”, “improve liquidity on these 
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capital adequacy did not satisfactorily reflect the economic risks to which financial 
institutions were exposed “. But this ambitious project failed and CreditMetrics never played 
the unifying role that JP Morgan had dreamed of. The diversity of methods of valorisation 
employed by the different banks has not really been reduced.  
 
Today, two main types of models are used. The model known as structural follows the 
reasoning of Black, Merton and Scholes which is part of the cognitive framework of financial 
markets. A default event is considered as endogenous and triggered, by example, when the 
share value of the indebted company is lower than the amount of the debt. The difficulty 
arises as a result of the absence in the case of credit derivatives of an actual market for the 
underlying asset. The value of the company in debt being unknown, the use of this type of 
model remains problematic. Other financial institutions use models known as default intensity 
which envisage the default risk as a chance event. The probability of the default must then be 
approached by actuarial type methods and computed using the observed term structure of 
credit spread. However, the default events being rare, the task is difficult and models of 
intensity are not a very safe guarantee regarding a true valuation of the products. Overall, one 
must note the considerable heterogeneity of models used which can probably be partly 
explained by the fact that the capacity to compute the value of products to be later sold with a 
profit margin is perceived as an element of the competitive advantage of large banks.  The 
convergence of the models, whilst displayed by the ISDA in its pressure on the regulator, is 
not really on the agenda. Adapting financial theory to default risk cannot be done without 
considerable difficulty.  
 
 
3.2.2 Obstacles to Legitimization  
 
Apart from difficulties linked to the putting into practice of ways of legitimizing the market,   
the thinking behind the belief that credit risk can and must be treated in the same way as a 
market risk comes up against a series of serious obstacles. Such obstacles arise from the large 
degree of incertitude in which attempts of marketization develop, but also from the very great 
heterogeneity in terms of cognitive and cultural instruments used by actors (or calculative 
agencies). In addition, interests differ and the marketization of credit risk comes up against 
political conflicts between the different parties concerned.  
 
 
-  An environment marked by  uncertainty  
 
There is a marked degree of uncertainty and a marked continuing evolutionary process in the 
market. The relationship between the emergence of the market and an environment which is 
far from stable is a close one. The evolution of the market depends principally on the actual 
definition of the product, on the organisation of national regulations and the coordination of 
international regulations as well as on changes in terms of accounting normalisation.    
More precisely, and with reference to the large-scale financial innovation which credit 
derivatives represent, the regulation has difficulty in evolving and several actors deplore the 
absence of a common regulatory framework.  The credit derivatives market, in fact, is of 
interest for different calculative agencies – a fact which renders harmonisation of regulations 
and a consensus on which calculative device to use, difficult. Several levels of regulation, in 
fact, operate side by side on a national, European and international level.  
The first level of regulation – that of the trans-national level is assured by the Joint Forum 
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the  International Association of Insurance Supervisors, i.e. the G10 supervisors of the 
insurance sector and the International Organization of Securities Commission. To this trans-
national level the European regulation is added. Three types of actors are concerned in terms 
of regulators: Firstly, the Council and the Parliament assisted by technical committees, 
secondly the Treasury and finally, the committee of the Central European Bank. At the 
national level the organisation varies according to the different countries: in the UK, there is 
only one regulator (the Financial Services Authority- FSA), in France, there are three 
(Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Financiers, Commission bancaire, Commission de 
Contrôle des Assurances), in the Netherlands, one (DWB). One of the key questions for the 
credit derivatives market, therefore, concerns the way the regulations are structured and 
where.     
“In an international context, one wonders who the qualified regulator is, and in addition, the constraints 
accumulate. Each local regulator has his interpretation of the rules and interferes with what we do. This 
is added to the Banking Commission’s prerogatives.” (A Banker)  
“We are in an international competition, the legal basis is unstable, the rules can be interpreted in 
different ways which are superimposed on top of each other” (A Regulator).   
“The general problem is not one of the markets being volatile but the regulations being volatile. For 
example, the AMF has a doctrine which is not explicit and which changes – it’s hell. We have tons of 
different regulations coming from different regulators which we have to deal with in a very short space 
of time” (A member of a mutual fund).   
 
Even if the basic tendency seems to be heading for a reinforced harmonisation, supervisors 
have their mutual differences and their capacity for action can diverge greatly – which does 
not contribute to a stabilising of the framework in which the transactions are carried out.   
“The regulatory authorities are much divided. The Banking Commission observes only what happens at 
a banking level and their field of supervision is therefore very narrow. There is too much fragmentation 
and the regulators do not take into consideration the interdependencies enough, or the effects of 
resonance and the disequilibrium which spreads from one sector to another. Their field of vision is 
corporatist, micro-prudential when it should favour a macro-prudential conception. And there is no real 
supervision at the European level – just a few networks here and there.” (An Economic Expert)) 
“This type of product contributes to the modification of the means of action and the attitudes of 
regulators. This poses the question of whether a separate set of regulations for banks, insurance 
companies and share markets would be pertinent”. (An Economic Expert) 
 
The approach concerning credit derivatives is poorly coordinated at the international level and 
the activism of different national regulators also reveals itself to be very variable. Informal 
discussions certainly take place at a world level but each country has chosen its own way of 
dealing. In one sense we can but observe the dynamism of the FSA which ensures a global 
supervision of the financial sector in England. Its May 2002 report is important from this 
point of view. Basel II which will make its entry in 2006-2007 gives market actors the hope 
that discussions concerning harmonisation of credit derivative dealings will soon see the light 
of day – which is not the case at present.  
 
-  Calculative agencies have heterogeneous cultural equipment and 
techniques  
 
Apart from the difficulty of coordinated action at a world-wide level and the absence of a 
stable environment, market actors present heterogeneous cultures and equipment. In fact, if 
the theory of financial risk is the natural cognitive framework for investment banks, other 
market actors do not share it. This is particularly the case for some mutual funds, insurance 
companies and, to a certain extent, regulators.  
Problems of credit derivatives, for example, sound quite differently for the banking sector 
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satisfied to apply their usual regulations. Moreover, insurance companies, of which certain 
had problems in the past, only intervene rarely on the market as they consider the product as 
being rather « heretical ».  These companies do not share the risk culture of banks and the 
vision of financial contracts which accompany this culture; banks prefer, more often, 
solutions which are rapidly negotiated in case of disagreement whereas insurance companies 
prefer a culture of procedure. This conflict of cultures between financial sectors sometimes 
prevents a good conclusion to contracts:    
“Banks subscribe to a reactive state of mind, of immediacy, whereas insurance companies adopt a 
longer timescale for their transactions and contest regulations systematically.” (A Regulator). 
 
Thus, for many bankers, the strongest curb slowing the market down is fundamentally a 
cultural one. It resides not only in difficulties of comprehension with other financial sectors 
but also with the different regulators. The latter, in fact, seem to resist the emergence of a new 
financial culture and, in this context, credit derivatives have difficulty in spreading and in 
developing outside a strictly banking framework.  Bankers declare that it is particularly 
difficult to hand over accounts to regulators who do not always grasp the technical dimension 
of the product and do not reason in the same way as them:  
“ This is a new activity, very technical, conceptually disconcerting. One has to justify oneself frequently 
to the regulators and each others’ positions are often restricting when one considers the complexity of 
the product.” (A Banker)  
“We are lobbying currently at the Prudential Commission as there is a fuzzy climate regarding 
regulations. But lobbying is being made difficult by the Regulator being prudent” (A Banker)   
 
  The regulators suspect credit derivatives of giving in to the pressure applied by bank 
shareholders who wish to diminish the regulatory capital in reducing at least the apparent risk 
in the bank portfolio.  What worries the regulator, then, is systemic risk and the possibility of 
transferring risk to un-regulated, hardly transparent entities such as hedge-funds. Apart from 
this, the reality of the mutualisation of risks remains problematic when one remembers that 
the six main banks in the market realise 50% alone of world-wide transactions.  
The regulator’s final worry is his wanting to protect collective saving. The possibility for 
mutual funds to invest in credit derivatives, in fact poses the problem of the amount of 
information delivered to the investors concerning the products which make up their portfolio. 
In France, the AMF is very prudent and grants its agreement to a very limited number of 
mutual funds which it seeks to be sure that they master the necessary technology and have at 
their disposition necessary techniques for evaluating risks correctly.   
“The market has been well accepted by the actors. The regulator, on the other hand, is less convinced. 
One does not know any longer where the risk is with credit derivatives. The asymmetry of information 
between vendor and buyer is considerable. Some buyers do not even know what they are holding in 
their hands” (A Regulator)   
 
 
Most of the bankers interviewed saw the problem of the market in finding a common 
language but more especially, technical tools in a context of global regulation complexity ; 
the process seems very slow from this point of view. Misunderstandings with regulators can 
often be seen:  
“The regulator’s power to bring prejudice is quite strong. The regulatory environment can be considered 
as an obstacle which slows business down. The biggest obstacle, in any case, is a cultural apprehension 
of many people who spend a disproportionate amount of time in controlling credit derivatives”. (A 
Banker)  
“ Internally, there was strong resistance to these products. Externally, the obstacle is the regulators who 
are blinkered. Basel II represents a step backwards in this sense. Regulators curbed the activity in all 
directions, it’s drastic, it’s terrible (….) The French regulator is behind the times which puts us way 
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negotiations orientated towards business. In France we are still playing the sterile game of cops and 
robbers”. (A Consultant)  
 
In addition, the putting into practice of the financial theory of risk supposes technical and 
human resources investments; investments which all the market actors are not equally willing 
to make. These asymmetries are counter-productive in installing necessary confidence in the 
construction of the market. The credit derivatives market abounds in innovations, which in 
itself represents a large cost of entry and renders certain interested parties more powerful than 
others.  
In this way, the Société Générale, appears as a particularly powerful and well-equipped actor 
in the French context, whereas JP Morgan represents the precursor in the promotion of the 
world-wide credit derivatives market. Thanks to their technical and human resources, these 
two banks have at their disposition a particularly vast capacity for innovation which accords 
them a key role in this market and a possibility of intervening which other actors do not have.  
“The Société Générale has battalions of legal experts just like the American banks, a large number of 
legal PhD’s, who are really very good. Not only do they master the product technically but they are well 
organised” (A legal expert)   
 “There has been an effort of systematic promotion by JP Morgan. They have been most regular in their 
efforts. They have put huge resources into manpower and technology and very quickly became very 
rapid in dealing with these products”.(A Banker)  
 
For these reasons, the credit derivatives market has difficulty in spreading beyond the banking 
sector. Given these unevenly distributed human and technical resources, the difficulty of other 
market actors (such as investors, regulators, insurance companies, etc) in understanding the 
product and its degree of complexity, engender important asymmetries between interested 
parties – which hardly helps in the spreading of a common cognitive framework. These 
asymmetries arise from differences between the professional handlers of the product and 
others in terms of equipment and qualification.  
“We often discuss the question of risk with our boss who used to be a trader before being head of our 
investment bank. With the ethics officers? No, never, they are completely at sea” (A banker)   
“It has to be said that it is a market of whodunits who have years of study behind them, who are 
engineers. They find it funny because it’s complicated and that credit derivatives are funnier than 
interest rate derivatives, because there are complex macro-economic aspects to deal with as well as 
micro aspects”.(A Banker)   
 
In this asymmetrical game, banks appear as being particularly powerful in defining the 
product and do not make the process of standardisation particularly easy.  
 “The public at large does not have direct access to credit derivatives and is not always aware of the 
amount of risk which it represents. The difficulty is to get developed and adapted financial information. 
This is true for all markets but more so for credit derivatives as banks keep their « secret of fabrication » 
close to their chest. But this is a technique which justifies having reference documents and as the banks 
release little information, there is an absence of formatting”.(A Regulator)   
 
One can also perceive some actors having considerable difficulty in understanding the 
mechanism itself of the financial operation – particularly in the domain of insurance:  
“ The regulator does not understand the product very well, he doesn’t say it’s not allowed but he doesn’t 
say it is allowed either”. (A legal expert)   
 “ Bankers have often overcharged insurers who were not aware of the size of the risk because they 
didn’t have enough technical knowledge”. (A Regulator) 
 
 
-   Political  Conflicts between Calculative agencies   
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The other obstacle on the road to legitimization concerns political conflicts between different 
market actors. What interests banks first of all in having credit derivatives acknowledged as 
risk management tools resides in the aim of reducing their regulatory capital. But this capital 
has been defined in order to meet the regulator’s concern about systemic risk. From the very 
beginning, therefore, there is mistrust by the regulator in the face of the banks’ argument.   
 
According to one regulator, the state of mind of different national and international regulators 
when faced with the arrival of new financial products can take one of two directions. Some 
have a positive attitude:   
“ They see the new product as something good, like a new way of exchanging, a way to complete the 
market in Arrow-Debreu fashion. This is the American way of seeing things and particularly that of 
Alan Greespan who has boasted the merits of credit derivatives “ (A Regulator)  
 
Others are more wary:  
 “ There are worries about mis-pricing (there are no good pricing models). Prudence is essential in a 
context where one is frightened of the weakening of the financial system worldwide. In fact the 
technique is quite simple when the underlying asset is unique and when it is quoted on an Exchange, but 
otherwise, we don’t have adequate instruments”. (A Regulator)   
 
Faced with this wariness, banks do not hesitate in deploying a lot of resources and energy in  
lobbying activities as well as in ways of getting round the legislation, which engenders a 
process of « overflowing » in relation to existing rules and then a phenomenon of things being 
put straight by regulatory authorities.(Callon, 1999) 
 
 “ The lobbying capacity of banks is considerable. They are very well equipped in this field and very 
inventive. The actors have always got technical means to offer new ways to regulating authorities. We 
are thus party to a cycle of regulation/innovation/regulation” (An Economist) 
 
  “The Société Générale is a very powerful actor which does a lot of lobbying. The doctrine of the 
Fédération des Banques Françaises  comes from the  Société Générale lobby. They impose their way of 
seeing things on everyone and some – mostly competitors – complain about the fact”. (A legal expert)  
 
This lobbying sometimes convinces:  
“ The debate between optimists and those who are prudent finally has been won by the optimists” (a 
regulator)   
 
But the failure of the ISDA to have the validity of internal models recognised by the Basel 
committee in the Basel II Agreement is a good illustration of the divergence of interest 
between regulators and bankers and of the difficulty of the latter to get the former to accept 
their argument.  
 
Another conflict of interest between investment banks and regulators is to do with the 
protection of the individual investor. As Abolafia showed, the opportunism of market actors 
can lead to crises which, if they impact individual investors, could create waves of extremely 
restrictive regulations. It is therefore important for investment banks to convince the regulator 
that the individual investor’s interests are protected.   
 
“The risk of asymmetries of information is real as the bank retains a higher degree of information than 
its correspondent. The buyers do not really have the same means at their disposition as vendors of risk.  
(…) the question is: are we not again going to transfer risks towards households and businesses? (…) In 
a period of prosperity, they (credit derivatives) boost performances, which attract subscribers. Only, 
there have been examples of unfortunate experiences in certain European countries (for example in Italy 
with Parmalat shares and individual investors turned to the banks for explanations) (…) The Italian 
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“We do, however want to protect the general public savings. It’s a matter of attention, even of 
precoccupation” (Another regulator)  
 
The refusal by the Spanish authorities to allow OPCVM’s to subscribe to credit derivatives is 
indicative of regulator wariness. In France, the AMF authorises very carefully. Only 20 
management companies out of 520 have so far received authorisation.   
 
Finally, we can see tensions between banks and insurance companies and between banks 
themselves.  
On the first point, insurers suspect American banks of having created the market in order to 
transfer their bad risks to European insurance companies - at a disadvantage through the 
asymmetry of information. This cautious attitude which seems to have originated in a few 
unfortunate affairs dating from the early days of the market and involving re-insurers and 
insurers led them to almost completely leave the credit derivatives market which had become 
quite illegitimate, which can be seen for instance in their financial communication.  
“The insurance companies do not see any real interest in this market, they have the impression that the 
market is not very liquid, has not reached maturity, and they are not very keen. Insurance companies are 
not promoters of credit derivatives” (a regulator)    
 “These products are somewhat diabolized by insurance companies. They are not put to the forefront in 
financial communication. Insurance companies are afraid that their stock exchange price will fall if they 
communicate about using credit derivatives; there is considerable mistrust. It must be said that the heart 
of the job of insurance companies is to provide people with the rates they promised” (A Regulator)  
 
 
On the second point, the promotion and the preservation of the credit derivatives market does 
not happen automatically. It requires on the part of investment banks an awareness of the 
existence of a common good and the necessity of collaborative action in order to protect this 
common good. However, this necessity is confronted by the competition between banks, 
which renders coalitions fragile and unstable.  
 
There are even a few conflicts at the heart of the ISDA, between different factions on the 
committee over, in particular, the definition of certain clauses. The debate around the so 
called ‘structuring’ clause has highlighted the disagreements between vendors and acquirers 
of protection. This conflict also revealed different practices in Europe and in the US and has 
resulted in a compromise in the 2003 documentation regarding modified restructuring and 
modified modified.  
 
Furthermore, the role of the ISDA is sometimes challenged by banks who have certainly an 
interest in creating a common position, but who, at the same time, wish to remain in small 
number and to eliminate competition :   
 “ JP Morgan would like to be the great forum, but they also know they couldn’t completely achieve this 
aim. JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank, respectively represent 20 to 30% of the market for structured 
products, four or five others sharing the rest of the market. This, in fact, is what we see on the indexes, 
two groups but in the end a fusion. The ISDA has become rather formal and the process is not very 
rapid. In some way, they are victims of their own success, imbalanced by the weight of the necessary 
procedures” (A Banker).    
 
“The role of the ISDA was very important in the construction of the market, but today, there is a lot of 
discussion . I have let them drop a bit”. (A Banker)  
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Our analysis of the credit derivatives market poses the question of the performativity of the 
theories and of the development of a cognitive framework common to all the actors.  In this 
paper, we have demonstrated the limits of the performativity of the theory of financial risk 
and the difficulties of collective action on the credit derivatives market. We have also stressed 
the hitherto unpublished role of regulation in the development of this market.  
 
In 1993, in a speech which has since often been quoted, Charles Sanford Jr the CEO of 
Bankers Trust, put forward his vision of the financial market in 2020. Traditional finance 
would be replaced by a ‘particle’ finance providing a progress of the same nature as that 
brought about by quantum physics and molecular biology. In cutting-up classical financial 
assets (a loan note, for instance) into risk particles (interest rate risk on the one hand, credit 
risk on the other), this new finance would permit us to « create order from apparent disorder, 
providing building blocks that would allow the more effective packaging and management of 
risk in an economy whose structure (is) constantly changing ». Thanks to financial markets 
which would become real markets of risk, «  the amount of unwanted risk borne by 
individuals, institutions and the system as a whole »would be reduced in size. At the same 
time, quantification, pricing, the management and allocation of the usual risks and even of 
risks not covered today - as they are not exchanged on a market - would be improved. 
Although the wished-for new finance seemed to him to be a distant aim at the moment of his 
speech, Charles Sanford Jr names credit derivatives as the pioneers of this new way of 
envisaging finance and the economy in general, even though they were just emerging. Credit 
derivatives, in fact, are the privileged means of dissociating default risk from other risks 
(Bruyère 2004).   
We have demonstrated in this paper the role played by this type of argument in the process of 
legitimization of the credit derivatives market. The idea put forward by investment banks is 
that credit risk can, and must, be dealt with as a classic financial risk – in other words, 
marketized  in such a way that all the actors can see the cost of the risk in a transparent way at 
all times.  
 
However, what our paper also demonstrates is that, in spite of considerable means put by the 
banks in support of this thesis, a large number of obstacles prevent its being accepted by 
market actors foreign to the banking community. The market remains very concentrated 
(many actors talk of an « endogamous » market, an « incestuous » market) and has difficulty 
in attaining the non banking part of the financial sphere. The relative reticence of insurance 
companies, the small number of accredited mutual fund companies in France and the battle 
already lost against Basel II as regards internal models show that particle finance fails to be 
fully accepted throughout the financial world.   
In a certain way, the performativity of financial theory seems only relative on the credit 
derivatives market. The calculative device which banks urgently seek to impose is not 
adopted without reserve. From a theoretical point of view, the question must be asked 
concerning the causes of this relative failure. 
 
A superficial reading of Mac Kenzie and Millo’s (2003) work shows that one of the major 
differences between the market they studied and the credit derivatives market resides – as 
regards the process of legitimization – in the absence in the market of credit derivatives of a 
centralised authority, which would be in charge of promoting the market. The large 
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the ability of the ISDA to mobilise large-scale resources. This said, internal tensions, and 
especially the structure itself of the market which rests on an over the counter basis, in spite of 
advances due to the ISDA in terms of normalisation, renders the coalition of actors fragile. 
Other coalitions are envisaged and the socialisation of banks around the idea of one common 
good remains more disparate than on an organised market (Martin, 2003). 
 
But, more fundamentally, it seems to us that the relative failure of the performativity of the 
financial theory of risk is a result of the heterogeneity of the cultural equipment and 
techniques of the different actors. The specificity of credit risk renders its acceptation as a 
market risk problematic for several reasons. The thesis, which is far from being natural, 
necessitates a large mobilisation of technical and human resources to be put into practice and 
market actors do not always have the means – or all the necessary motivation to put it into 
practice.  In some way, we can say that market actors evolve in different worlds, in Boltanski 
and Thévenot’s (1991) sense, and that the question of process of coordination between the 
different worlds has been only partially resolved.  This explains the large concentration of the 
market; i.e. its difficulty to become a real financial market, peopled by numerous actors 
exchanging large volumes in adequate transparency.  
Furthermore, the more general question of the development of certain financial innovations in 
a context which is very much evolving and marked by numerous uncertainties can be 
mentioned.  These new, very complex, difficult to understand – even by specialists in the 
financial world – financial products, which have become very malleable by technical and 
regulatory evolutions hardly allow for the emergence of a common cognitive framework for 
interested parties in the market or even the existence of a memory shared by the different 
actors in the important stages of its development.   
 
In addition to having demonstrated the limits of the performativity of the financial theory of 
risk and the difficulty of promoting a common cognitive framework, our contribution also 
consists of exposing the interactions between the development of financial innovations and 
regulations in a way hitherto unseen.  In the case of this particular market – and contrary to 
widespread belief where regulation is seen to be restrictive – it seems that the Committee of 
Basle’s legal regulatory framework has played a role in the emergence of the credit 
derivatives market. Following on from the first modification of the regulation in relation to 
international ratios of solvency, the demands for regulatory capital have reduced somewhat 
with the acceptation by the regulator of partial hedging by credit derivatives. Our research has 
highlighted the fact that the initial development of this market thus finds its origins in the 
regulatory framework and the new requirements of the Basel Committee for bank solvency in 
1998.  
In this perspective, one observes phenomena of “framing and overflowing
10” in the market - 
in line with   Callon’s analyses (1999). Alongside the stage by stage development and 
formalisation of regulations, banks undertake strategies in order to bypass regulations through 
developing innovations and new financial products – which contributes to development and 
the perpetuating of new markets. Attempts at getting round regulations lead even the banks to 
deal with poorly regulated actors such as hedge funds. This immediately leads to questions of 
opportunism being posed:  
“There are opportunists in this market:  hedge funds for instance.   If we imagine a credit crisis, the 
product is deteriorated, the insurer wants to sell, you will then buy it after negotiating and then sell it on 
to a hedge fund, negotiation will be hard. Your reputation is at stake” (a banker) 
“ Black sheep? There are some. But the whole of the problem is one of competence. Do people really 
understand what they’re doing? Obviously, the problem is the trader who sells nuclear waste, and then 
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once the bloke is irradiated he finds the trader has already taken off with his bonus in his pocket”. (a 
banker)  
 
Over and above these contributions, however, our research does have some limitations. First 
of all, it investigated the market from the point of view of French banks, which is but one 
possible way of approaching the market. Its international nature could lead to alternative 
analyses in taking into better consideration the position of actor-leaders in the market, or the 
comparison of national specificities in legal and accounting terms. Secondly, our reliance on 
retrospective interviews could lead to a bias of rationalisation after the event. For all this, the 
use of secondary data and in particular the study of articles which had appeared in the 
specialised press allow us to triangulate the data, and in this sense, to strengthen our analyses. 
Finally, the instability of the regulatory context and the malleability of the product, poses the 
problem of the soundness of certain conclusions. 
This research also opens up the way for further interesting work. In fact, studying the credit 
derivatives market, questions in a particularly pointed way the feasibility of the marketisation 
of different sorts of risks. Attempts at having CAT-bonds, risks of attack or rights to pollute 
exchanged in financial markets as a way to manage risks in an economically and socially 
efficient way could therefore be analysed according to the economic sociological categories 
raised in this paper.  
To conclude, it would seem that in the regulating and normalising process observed on credit 
derivatives markets, private actors are the driving force. Their capacity for lobbying is 
determinant in the ensuring that the strongest actors prevail, which is to say they are the ones 
who will mobilise human and technical resources in the process of legitimization. The 
question of general interest and accountability then remains (Sassen, 2004): Who preserves 
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Appendix 1: Types of credit derivatives 
 
The credit derivatives being currently used in the market can be broadly classified into the following: 
Credit default swap: 
In a credit default swap, the protection seller agrees, for an upfront or continuing premium or fee, to 
compensate the protection buyer upon the happening of a specified event, such as a default, 
downgrading of the obligor, apprehended default etc. Credit default swap covers only the credit risk 
inherent in the asset, while risks on account of other factors such as interest rate movements remains 
with the originator 
Total return swap: 
As the name implies, a total return swap is a swap of the total return out of a credit asset against a 
contracted prefixed return. The total return out of a credit asset can be affected by various factors, 
some of which may be quite extraneous to the asset in question, such as interest rate movements, 
exchange rate fluctuations etc. Nevertheless, the protection seller here guarantees a prefixed return to 
the originator, who in turn, agrees to pass on the entire collections from the credit asset to the 
protection seller. That is to say, the protection buyer swaps the total return from a credit asset for a 
predetermined, prefixed return. 
.Credit linked notes: 
Credit linked notes are a securitized form of credit derivatives. The technology of securitisation here 
has been borrowed from the catastrophe bonds or risk securitization instruments . Here, the protection 
buyer issues notes. The investor who buys the notes has to suffer either a delay in repayment or has 
to forego interest, if a specified credit event, say, default or bankruptcy, takes place. This device also 
transfers merely the credit risk and not other risks involved with the credit asset. 
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Buyers  of protection 
Actors 1999  2004 
Banks 63%  47% 
speculative/investment funds  3%  13% 
Companies 6%  7  % 
Insurance Companies   7%  4% 
Others 21%  29% 
 
 
Protection Vendors  
Actors 1999  2004 
Banks 47%  32% 
Insurance companies   23%  33% 
Speculative/investment funds  5%  7 % 
Companies 3%  4% 
Other 22%  29% 
Source BBA Credit Derivatives Survey 2002 
 